Template:Comparison of Schulze to preferential voting systems

2020-10-29T12:21:34Z

79.136.72.131: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ranked_pairs#Independence_of_irrelevant_alternatives states itself it fails the criteria

{| class="wikitable collapsible sortable" style="text-align:center;"
|+ Comparison of preferential electoral systems
|-
! style="width:8%;" | System
! style="width:3%;" | [[Monotonicity criterion|Monotonic]]
! style="width:3%;" | [[Condorcet criterion|Condorcet]]
! style="width:3%;" | [[Majority criterion|Majority]]
! style="width:3%;" | [[Condorcet loser criterion|Condorcet loser]]
! style="width:3%;" | [[Majority loser criterion|Majority loser]]
! style="width:3%;" | [[Mutual majority criterion|Mutual majority]]
! style="width:3%;" | [[Smith criterion|Smith]]
! style="width:3%;" | [[Independence of Smith-dominated alternatives|ISDA]]
! style="width:3%;" | [[Independence of irrelevant alternatives#Local independence|LIIA]]
! style="width:3%;" | [[Independence of clones criterion|Independence of clones]]
! style="width:3%;" | [[Reversal symmetry]]
! style="width:3%;" | [[Participation criterion|Participation]], [[consistency criterion|consistency]]
! style="width:3%;" | [[Later-no-harm criterion|Later-no‑harm]]
! style="width:3%;" | [[Later-no-help criterion|Later-no‑help]]
! style="width:3%;" | [[Polynomial time]]
! style="width:3%;" | [[Resolvability criterion|Resolvability]]
|-
! [[Schulze method|Schulze]]
| {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}}
|-
! [[Ranked pairs]]
| {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}}
|-
! [[Tideman alternative method|Tideman's Alternative]]
| {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}}
|-
! [[Kemeny–Young method|Kemeny–Young]]
| {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{no}} || {{yes}}|| {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{yes}}
|-
! [[Copeland's method|Copeland]]
| {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{yes}}|| {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{no}}
|-
! [[Nanson's method|Nanson]]
| {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}}
|-
! [[Instant-runoff voting]]
| {{no}} || {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}}
|-
! [[Borda count|Borda]]
| {{yes}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}}
|-
! [[Nanson's method#Baldwin method|Baldwin]]
| {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}}
|-
! [[Bucklin voting|Bucklin]]
| {{yes}} || {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}}
|-
! [[Plurality voting system|Plurality]]
| {{yes}} || {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}}
|-
! [[Contingent vote|Contingent voting]]
| {{no}} || {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}}
|-
! [[Coombs' method|Coombs]]<ref name=truncation>Anti-plurality, Coombs and Dodgson are assumed to receive truncated preferences by apportioning possible rankings of unlisted alternatives equally; for example, ballot A > B = C is counted as <math>\tfrac{1}{2}</math> A > B > C and <math>\tfrac{1}{2}</math> A > C > B. If these methods are assumed not to receive truncated preferences, then [[later-no-harm criterion|later-no-harm]] and [[later-no-help criterion|later-no-help]] are not applicable.</ref>
| {{no}} || {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}}
|-
! [[Minimax Condorcet|MiniMax]]
| {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}}
|-
! [[Anti-plurality voting|Anti-plurality]]<ref name=truncation></ref>
| {{yes}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}}
|-
! [[Sri Lankan contingent vote|Sri Lankan contingent voting]]
| {{no}} || {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}}
|-
! [[Supplementary vote|Supplementary voting]]
| {{no}} || {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}}
|-
! [[Dodgson's method|Dodgson]]<ref name=truncation></ref>
| {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{yes}}
|}

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Template:Comparison of Schulze to preferential voting systems