Difference between revisions of "Template:Comparison of Schulze to preferential voting systems"
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| − | | style="width:8%;" | | + | ! colspan="17" | {{Navbar-collapsible|Comparison of Preferential Electoral Systems|Template:Comparison of Schulze to preferential voting systems}} |
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| − | + | ! style="width:3%;" | [[Monotonicity criterion|Monotonic]] | |
| − | + | ! style="width:3%;" | [[Condorcet criterion|Condorcet]] | |
| − | + | ! style="width:3%;" | [[Majority criterion|Majority]] | |
| − | + | ! style="width:3%;" | [[Condorcet loser criterion|Condorcet loser]] | |
| − | + | ! style="width:3%;" | [[Majority loser criterion|Majority loser]] | |
| − | + | ! style="width:3%;" | [[Mutual majority criterion|Mutual majority]] | |
| − | + | ! style="width:3%;" | [[Smith criterion|Smith]] | |
| − | + | ! style="width:3%;" | [[Independence of Smith-dominated alternatives|ISDA]] | |
| − | + | ! style="width:3%;" | [[Independence of irrelevant alternatives#Local independence|LIIA]] | |
| − | + | ! style="width:3%;" | [[Independence of clones criterion|Clone independence]] | |
| − | + | ! style="width:3%;" | [[Reversal symmetry]] | |
| − | + | ! style="width:3%;" | [[Participation criterion|Participation]], [[consistency criterion|Consistency]] | |
| − | + | ! style="width:3%;" | [[Later-no-harm criterion|Later-no‑harm]] | |
| − | + | ! style="width:3%;" | [[Later-no-help criterion|Later-no‑help]] | |
| + | ! style="width:3%;" | [[Polynomial time]] | ||
| + | ! style="width:3%;" | [[Resolvability criterion|Resolvability]] | ||
|- | |- | ||
! [[Schulze method|Schulze]] | ! [[Schulze method|Schulze]] | ||
Revision as of 15:11, 4 September 2018
Comparison of Preferential Electoral Systems
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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Monotonic | Condorcet | Majority | Condorcet loser | Majority loser | Mutual majority | Smith | ISDA | LIIA | Clone independence | Reversal symmetry | Participation, Consistency | Later-no‑harm | Later-no‑help | Polynomial time | Resolvability | |
| Schulze | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Ranked pairs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Alternative smith | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Alternative schwartz | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Kemeny-Young | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | Yes |
| Copeland | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Nanson | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Instant-runoff voting | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Borda | Yes | No | No | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Baldwin | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Bucklin | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Plurality | Yes | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Contingent voting | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Coombs[1] | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| MiniMax | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Anti-plurality[1] | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Sri Lankan contingent voting | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Supplementary voting | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Dodgson[1] | No | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes |
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 Anti-plurality, Coombs and Dodgson are assumed to receive truncated preferences by apportioning possible rankings of unlisted alternatives equally; for example, ballot A > B = C is counted as <math>\tfrac{1}{2}</math> A > B > C and <math>\tfrac{1}{2}</math> A > C > B. If these methods are assumed not to receive truncated preferences, then Later-no-harm and Later-no-help are not applicable.