Difference between revisions of "Template:Comparison of Schulze to preferential voting systems"
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Revision as of 17:51, 28 May 2016
Comparison of Schulze to preferential voting systems
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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Monotonic | Condorcet | Majority | Condorcet loser | Majority loser | Mutual majority | Smith | ISDA | LIIA | Clone independence | Reversal symmetry | Participation, Consistency | Later-no‑harm | Later-no‑help | Polynomial time | Resolvability | MinMax | |
| Schulze | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Ranked pairs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | No |
| Kemeny-Young | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | Yes | |
| Copeland | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | No | |
| Nanson | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | |
| Instant-runoff voting | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| Borda | Yes | No | No | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| Baldwin | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | |
| Bucklin | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| Plurality | Yes | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| Contingent voting | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| Coombs[1] | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | |
| MiniMax | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | |
| Anti-plurality[1] | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | Yes | Yes | |
| Sri Lankan contingent voting | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| Supplementary voting | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | |
| Dodgson[1] | No | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | |
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 Anti-plurality, Coombs and Dodgson are assumed to receive truncated preferences by apportioning possible rankings of unlisted alternatives equally; for example, ballot A > B = C is counted as <math>\tfrac{1}{2}</math> A > B > C and <math>\tfrac{1}{2}</math> A > C > B. If these methods are assumed not to receive truncated preferences, then Later-no-harm and Later-no-help are not applicable.