Difference between revisions of "Template:Comparison of Schulze to preferential voting systems"

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{| class="wikitable collapsible sortable" style="text-align:center"
! colspan="18" | {{Navbar-collapsible|Comparison of Preferential Electoral Systems|Template:Comparison of Schulze to preferential voting systems}}
 
 
|-
 
|-
| style="width:8%;" |
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! colspan="17" | {{Navbar-collapsible|Comparison of Preferential Electoral Systems|Template:Comparison of Schulze to preferential voting systems}}
| style="width:3%;" | [[Monotonicity criterion|Monotonic]]
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|-
| style="width:3%;" | [[Condorcet criterion|Condorcet]]
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! style="width:8%;" |
| style="width:3%;" | [[Majority criterion|Majority]]
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! style="width:3%;" | [[Monotonicity criterion|Monotonic]]
| style="width:3%;" | [[Condorcet loser criterion|Condorcet loser]]
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! style="width:3%;" | [[Condorcet criterion|Condorcet]]
| style="width:3%;" | [[Majority loser criterion|Majority loser]]
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! style="width:3%;" | [[Majority criterion|Majority]]
| style="width:3%;" | [[Mutual majority criterion|Mutual majority]]
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! style="width:3%;" | [[Condorcet loser criterion|Condorcet loser]]
| style="width:3%;" | [[Smith criterion|Smith]]
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! style="width:3%;" | [[Majority loser criterion|Majority loser]]
| style="width:3%;" | [[Independence of Smith-dominated alternatives|ISDA]]
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! style="width:3%;" | [[Mutual majority criterion|Mutual majority]]
| style="width:3%;" | [[Independence of irrelevant alternatives#Local independence|LIIA]]
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! style="width:3%;" | [[Smith criterion|Smith]]
| style="width:3%;" | [[Independence of clones criterion|Clone independence]]
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! style="width:3%;" | [[Independence of Smith-dominated alternatives|ISDA]]
| style="width:3%;" | [[Reversal symmetry]]
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! style="width:3%;" | [[Independence of irrelevant alternatives#Local independence|LIIA]]
| style="width:3%;" | [[Participation criterion|Participation]], [[consistency criterion|Consistency]]
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! style="width:3%;" | [[Independence of clones criterion|Clone independence]]
| style="width:3%;" | [[Later-no-harm criterion|Later-no‑harm]]
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! style="width:3%;" | [[Reversal symmetry]]
| style="width:3%;" | [[Later-no-help criterion|Later-no‑help]]
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! style="width:3%;" | [[Participation criterion|Participation]], [[consistency criterion|Consistency]]
| style="width:3%;" | [[Polynomial time]]
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! style="width:3%;" | [[Later-no-harm criterion|Later-no‑harm]]
| style="width:3%;" | [[Resolvability criterion|Resolvability]]
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! style="width:3%;" | [[Later-no-help criterion|Later-no‑help]]
 +
! style="width:3%;" | [[Polynomial time]]
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! style="width:3%;" | [[Resolvability criterion|Resolvability]]
 
|-
 
|-
 
! [[Schulze method|Schulze]]
 
! [[Schulze method|Schulze]]

Revision as of 15:11, 4 September 2018

Comparison of Preferential Electoral Systems
Monotonic Condorcet Majority Condorcet loser Majority loser Mutual majority Smith ISDA LIIA Clone independence Reversal symmetry Participation, Consistency Later-no‑harm Later-no‑help Polynomial time Resolvability
Schulze Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
Ranked pairs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes
Alternative smith No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No No Yes Yes
Alternative schwartz No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No No Yes Yes
Kemeny-Young Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No No No Yes
Copeland Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes No No No Yes No
Nanson No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes Yes
Instant-runoff voting No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Borda Yes No No Yes Yes No No No No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Baldwin No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Bucklin Yes No Yes No Yes Yes No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes
Plurality Yes No Yes No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Contingent voting No No Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Coombs[1] No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No No No Yes Yes
MiniMax Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No No No No No No Yes Yes
Anti-plurality[1] Yes No No No Yes No No No No No No Yes No No Yes Yes
Sri Lankan contingent voting No No Yes No No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Supplementary voting No No Yes No No No No No No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Dodgson[1] No Yes Yes No No No No No No No No No No No No Yes
  1. 1.0 1.1 1.2 Anti-plurality, Coombs and Dodgson are assumed to receive truncated preferences by apportioning possible rankings of unlisted alternatives equally; for example, ballot A > B = C is counted as <math>\tfrac{1}{2}</math> A > B > C and <math>\tfrac{1}{2}</math> A > C > B. If these methods are assumed not to receive truncated preferences, then Later-no-harm and Later-no-help are not applicable.