Difference between revisions of "Template:Comparison of Schulze to preferential voting systems"
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imported>Izno (so much fail) |
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| − | {| class="wikitable collapsible sortable" style="text-align:center" | + | {| class="wikitable collapsible sortable" style="text-align:center;" |
| − | |+ Comparison of | + | |+ Comparison of preferential electoral systems |
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! style="width:3%;" | [[Independence of clones criterion|Clone independence]] | ! style="width:3%;" | [[Independence of clones criterion|Clone independence]] | ||
! style="width:3%;" | [[Reversal symmetry]] | ! style="width:3%;" | [[Reversal symmetry]] | ||
| − | ! style="width:3%;" | [[Participation criterion|Participation]], [[consistency criterion| | + | ! style="width:3%;" | [[Participation criterion|Participation]], [[consistency criterion|consistency]] |
! style="width:3%;" | [[Later-no-harm criterion|Later-no‑harm]] | ! style="width:3%;" | [[Later-no-harm criterion|Later-no‑harm]] | ||
! style="width:3%;" | [[Later-no-help criterion|Later-no‑help]] | ! style="width:3%;" | [[Later-no-help criterion|Later-no‑help]] | ||
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| − | ! [[Coombs' method|Coombs]]<ref name=truncation>Anti-plurality, Coombs and Dodgson are assumed to receive truncated preferences by apportioning possible rankings of unlisted alternatives equally; for example, ballot A > B = C is counted as <math>\tfrac{1}{2}</math> A > B > C and <math>\tfrac{1}{2}</math> A > C > B. If these methods are assumed not to receive truncated preferences, then [[ | + | ! [[Coombs' method|Coombs]]<ref name=truncation>Anti-plurality, Coombs and Dodgson are assumed to receive truncated preferences by apportioning possible rankings of unlisted alternatives equally; for example, ballot A > B = C is counted as <math>\tfrac{1}{2}</math> A > B > C and <math>\tfrac{1}{2}</math> A > C > B. If these methods are assumed not to receive truncated preferences, then [[later-no-harm criterion|later-no-harm]] and [[later-no-help criterion|later-no-help]] are not applicable.</ref> |
| {{no}} || {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} | | {{no}} || {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{no}} || {{yes}} || {{yes}} | ||
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Revision as of 20:22, 20 October 2020
| Monotonic | Condorcet | Majority | Condorcet loser | Majority loser | Mutual majority | Smith | ISDA | LIIA | Clone independence | Reversal symmetry | Participation, consistency | Later-no‑harm | Later-no‑help | Polynomial time | Resolvability | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Schulze | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Ranked pairs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Tideman's Alternative | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Kemeny–Young | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | Yes |
| Copeland | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Nanson | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Instant-runoff voting | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Borda | Yes | No | No | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Baldwin | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Bucklin | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Plurality | Yes | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Contingent voting | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Coombs[1] | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| MiniMax | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Anti-plurality[1] | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Sri Lankan contingent voting | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Supplementary voting | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Dodgson[1] | No | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes |
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 Anti-plurality, Coombs and Dodgson are assumed to receive truncated preferences by apportioning possible rankings of unlisted alternatives equally; for example, ballot A > B = C is counted as <math>\tfrac{1}{2}</math> A > B > C and <math>\tfrac{1}{2}</math> A > C > B. If these methods are assumed not to receive truncated preferences, then later-no-harm and later-no-help are not applicable.