Difference between revisions of "Template:Comparison of Schulze to preferential voting systems"
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|+ Comparison of preferential electoral systems | |+ Comparison of preferential electoral systems | ||
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| − | ! style="width:8%;" | | + | ! style="width:8%;" | Sys­tem |
! style="width:3%;" | [[Monotonicity criterion|Mono­tonic]] | ! style="width:3%;" | [[Monotonicity criterion|Mono­tonic]] | ||
! style="width:3%;" | [[Condorcet criterion|Cond­orcet]] | ! style="width:3%;" | [[Condorcet criterion|Cond­orcet]] | ||
Revision as of 20:30, 20 October 2020
| System | Monotonic | Condorcet | Majority | Condorcet loser | Majority loser | Mutual majority | Smith | ISDA | LIIA | Clone independence | Reversal symmetry | Participation, consistency | Later-no‑harm | Later-no‑help | Polynomial time | Resolvability |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Schulze | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Ranked pairs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Tideman's Alternative | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Kemeny–Young | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | Yes |
| Copeland | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | No |
| Nanson | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Instant-runoff voting | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Borda | Yes | No | No | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Baldwin | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Bucklin | Yes | No | Yes | No | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Plurality | Yes | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Contingent voting | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Coombs[1] | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| MiniMax | Yes | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Anti-plurality[1] | Yes | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | No | No | Yes | Yes |
| Sri Lankan contingent voting | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Supplementary voting | No | No | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Dodgson[1] | No | Yes | Yes | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | No | Yes |
- ↑ 1.0 1.1 1.2 Anti-plurality, Coombs and Dodgson are assumed to receive truncated preferences by apportioning possible rankings of unlisted alternatives equally; for example, ballot A > B = C is counted as <math>\tfrac{1}{2}</math> A > B > C and <math>\tfrac{1}{2}</math> A > C > B. If these methods are assumed not to receive truncated preferences, then later-no-harm and later-no-help are not applicable.